

## Message Text

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 037684 TOSEC 040005

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FROM ASST SECRETARY SCHAUFLE, AF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS:PFOR, AO, CG, ZA

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM: MESSAGES FOR KAUNDA AND MOBUTU:  
ANGOLA AND ECONOMIC AID (S/S NO. 7603262 )

### 1. PART I: MESSAGE TO KAUNDA

ON FEBRUARY 16 YOU ASKED ME TO PREPARE FOR YOUR APPROVAL INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE SENT TO AMBASSADOR WILKOWSKI AT LUSAKA FOR HER USE IN A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA WHICH WOULD ELICIT (A) ZAMBIAN VIEWS AS TO HOW IT SEES THE FUTURE OF ZAMBIAN-ANGOLAN RELATIONS, (B) ZAMBIA'S POLICY REGARDING FUTURE ASSISTANCE BY ITSELF AND OTHERS TO UNITA WHILE THE LATTER PURSUES GUERRILLA OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MPLA GOVERNMENT IN ANGOLA AND (C) ZAMBIA'S URGENT APPROACH TO US REGARDING CONCRETE MEASURES IT FEELS WE AND OTHER FRIENDLY DONOR GOVERNMENTS MAY TAKE TO HELP TIDE THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY OVER ITS CURRENT DISTRESS. I ALSO JUDGE THAT YOU WISH THE MESSAGE TO CONTAIN OUR WARM AND SECRET

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POSITIVE ASSURANCE THAT IT WILL BE THE POLICY OF THE US TO RENDER ALL FEASIBLE SUPPORT TO ZAMBIA IN THE FACE OF THREATS TO ITS FUTURE OCCASIONED BY THE IMPLANTATION OF A SOVIET-SUPPORTED MARXIST REGIME IN NEIGHBORING ANGOLA.

2. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION

WITH YOUR CONCURRENCE WE WOULD INSTRUCT AMBASSADOR WILKOWSKI TO SEEK A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. USING THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS SHE WOULD SAY:

--THE UNITED STATES NOT ONLY SHARES WITH ZAMBIA DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE OUTCOME IN ANGOLA BUT ALSO WISHES TO EXPRESS TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA OUR APPRECIATION FOR THE CONCERN WE KNOW HE FEELS OVER THE PROSPECT OF AN UNFRIENDLY, SOVIET-SUPPORTED GOVERNMENT ON HIS WESTERN FRONTIER.

--THE US REMAINS FIRM IN ITS POLICY TO EXERT EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TOWARD THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND THE MINIMIZING OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN ANGOLA. IT WISHES TO WORK WITH ALL OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS TO THIS END.

--IN RECENT DAYS WE HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO COMMUNICATE TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OUR CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE STABILITY OF CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE IN ANGOLA OF A SIZABLE CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND A LARGE AND POTENTIALLY TROUBLESOME SOVIET AND SOVIET-BLOC PRESENCE.

--WE ARE TRYING TO PERSUADE THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO DELAY RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA AND TO LINK RECOGNITION WITH A CALL FOR THE ENDING OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND A BEGINNING OF RECONCILIATION.

--THE USG IS ANXIOUS TO HAVE PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S ASSESSMENT OF THE NATURE OF ZAMBIA'S SHORT-TERM RELATIONS WITH THE MPLA REGIME. DOES THE PRESIDENT BELIEVE ZAMBIA WILL FEEL IT NECESSARY TO EXTEND RECOGNITION TO THE MPLA GOVERNMENT? IF SO, WHAT WOULD BE THE TIMING?

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--IF AND WHEN ZAMBIA RECOGNIZES THE MPLA WHAT WILL BE ZAMBIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD UNITA? WILL IT ACTIVELY HELP SAVIMBI CONTINUE HIS GUERRILLA OPERATIONS? WILL IT ALLOW UNITA TO USE ZAMBIAN TERRITORY AS A SANCTUARY?

--THE USG STILL HAS RESOURCES THAT IT CAN MAKE AVAILABLE TO UNITA, IN THE FULL REALIZATION THAT THE CONTINUANCE OF SUCH AID WILL BE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT AS THE WEEKS PASS.

--IF SAVIMBI IS SUCCESSFUL IN CARRYING OUT SUSTAINED RESISTANCE TO THE MPLA WOULD GRZ ALLOW TRANSIT OF ITS

TERRITORY FOR ASSISTANCE AND SUPPLIES DESTINED FOR HIM?

--WE ARE ASKING OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY AT THEIR FORTHCOMING MEETINGS THE URGENT NEED FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE ECONOMIES AND TO THE SECURITY OF BOTH ZAIRE AND ZAMBIA.

--OFFICERS IN WASHINGTON BENEFITED GREATLY FROM RECENT TALKS WITH MESSRS KUWANI AND WALUSIKU IN GAINING AN APPRECIATION OF THE SCOPE OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WHICH CONFRONT ZAMBIA. THE USG IS CONCERNED WITH THE TIME FACTOR IN THE LIGHT OF THE URGENCY AND MAGNITUDE OF ZAMBIA'S NEEDS AS WELL AS THE PRESSING NEED TO PRESENT REQUESTS FOR US ASSISTANCE IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO THE CONGRESS WHICH IS ABOUT TO BEGIN CONSIDERATION OF NEXT YEAR'S FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BUDGET. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY IMPETUS PRESIDENT KAUNDA CAN GIVE TO HIS GOVERNMENT IN FORMULATING THE REQUESTS IT IS LIKELY TO MAKE OF THE USG. SENATORS HUMPHREY AND CLARK FEEL ENCOURAGED ABOUT THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS OUR AID REQUESTS ON BEHALF OF ZAMBIA ARE LIKELY TO HAVE IN THE CONGRESS.

--WE TRUST THE PRESIDENT REALIZES THAT THE US IS NOT IN A POSITION TO MEET ALL THE POSSIBLE NEEDS OF ZAMBIA, BUT IT WISHES TO PLAY AN APPROPRIATE PART. THEREFORE WE WOULD WELCOME INFORMATION ON PRESENT ZAMBIAN ASSESSMENT OF REACTIONS OF OTHERS(INCLUDING IBRD, IMF AND OTHER GOVERN-  
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MENTS) TO ZAMBIAN APPROACH. WE ALSO HOPE THAT ZAMBIA WILL TAKE STEPS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TO COORDINATE DONOR ACTIVITIES AND CONTRIBUTION TO AVOID DUPLICATION AND TO INSURE THAT EACH DONOR IS CALLED UPON FOR THE SORT OF AID THAT IT CAN PROVIDE BEST. WE WILL CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE OTHER DONORS AND TO APPRISE THEM OF OUR PERCEPTION OF ZAMBIA'S NEEDS.

### 3. PART II: MESSAGE TO MOBUTU

ON FEBRUARY 16 YOU ALSO INSTRUCTED ME TO PREPARE A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MOBUTU WHICH WOULD INFORM HIM OF (A) THE FIRMNESS OF US POLICY, (B) OUR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FROM ANGOLA AND THE DIMINUTION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE THERE, (C) OUR CURRENT EFFORTS TO DELAY WESTERN EUROPEAN RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA, (D) OUR CONCURRENT EFFORTS TO ALERT OUR FRIENDS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO THE URGENT NEED OF ZAMBIA AND ZAIRE FOR ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND (E) OUR POLICY TO DO EVERYTHING FEASIBLE TO INCREASE OUR OWN LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE

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IN BOTH THE ECONOMIC AND SECURITY FIELDS.

4. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION

IF YOU CONCUR WE WOULD ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS THAT CHARGE WALKER SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH MOBUTU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THAT HE SHOULD USE THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS:

--THE USG STILL BELIEVES THAT THE COMMON POLICY WE PURSUED IN ANGOLA THESE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS IN AN EFFORT TO BOLSTER THE MAJORITY LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA WAS CORRECT.

--THE US SHARES WITH PRESIDENT MOBUTU THE BITTER DISAPPOINTMENT WE KNOW HE FEELS AT THE FAILURE OF OUR JOINT EFFORTS.

--WE SINCERELY REGRET THAT, IN THE END, WE COULD NOT PROVIDE THE SUPPORT WHICH WE BELIEVE WAS NEEDED. BUT WE  
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TRUST THAT MANY HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS EXPERIENCE LESSONS THAT WILL NOT BE LOST IN THE FUTURE.

--FOR OUR PART WE ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE TO OPPOSE FURTHER SOVIET/CUBAN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA WHEREVER IT MAY OCCUR.

--CURRENTLY THE US IS ENDEAVORING TO PERSUADE ITS FRIENDS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO WITHHOLD RECOGNITION OF MPLA IN ORDER NOT TO APPEAR TO "REWARD" SO READILY THIS MINORITY GOVERNMENT IMPOSED ON ANGOLA BY CUBAN TROOPS AND SOVIET ARMS. REALIZING THAT RECOGNITION BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IS INEVITABLE, HOWEVER, WE ARE ASKING COMMUNITY MEMBERS TO LINK THEIR RECOGNITION TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS AND THE MINIMIZING OF SOVIET INFLUENCE AND TO AN MPLA POLICY OF RECONCILIATION.

--IN OUR APPROACHES TO THE EUROPEANS WE HAVE TAKEN SPECIAL PAINS TO ALERT COMMUNITY MEMBERS TO THE SERIOUS ECONOMIC AND SECURITY PROBLEMS FACED NOW BY ZAIRE AND ZAMBIA AND TO URGE THAT THEY PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE HELP TO BOTH COUNTRIES AS THEY CONFRONT POTENTIAL THREATS BY THE MPLA REGIME IN ANGOLA. WE ARE STRESSING WITH THEM THE NEED FOR BUILDING UP THE STRENGTH OF THE ZAIRIAN AND ZAMBIAN ECONOMIES AT HOME TO ENABLE THEM TO WITHSTAND ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE THEIR SECURITY.

--THE UNITED STATES HAS NO EARLY PLANS FOR THE RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA REGIME; ON THE CONTRARY IT IS PREPARED, IN CONSULTATION WITH ANGOLA'S NEIGHBORS, TO CONTINUE TO

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PROVIDE WHATEVER ASSISTANCE IT CAN TO UNITA AS LONG AS IT IS ABLE TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE RESISTANCE TO THE MPLA.

--WE WOULD GREATLY VALUE AT THIS JUNCTURE THE PRESIDENT'S ASSESSMENT OF HOW ZAIRE EXPECTS TO PURSUE ITS CONNECTIONS WITH ANGOLA IN THE SHORT AND MID-TERM.

--WHAT IS THE PRESIDENT'S THINKING REGARDING THE NECESSITY OF ZAIRE'S EVENTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA REGIME? WHAT SECRET

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ARE THE TIME FACTORS WHICH CONCERN HIM?

--WILL HE CONTINUE TO AID FNLA AND UNITA AND SUPPORT THEIR RESISTANCE?

--WE ARE AT THE BEGINNING OF ANOTHER LEGISLATIVE CYCLE AND WISH TO MAKE BUDGETARY PROVISION FOR MEETING ZAIRE'S ECONOMIC AND SECURITY NEEDS FOR FY 1977. WE URGE HIM TO LET US KNOW WHAT WE MAY EXPECT FROM IT IN THE WAY OF AID REQUESTS.

##### 5. PART III: MESSAGE TO SELECTED AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS

SINCE PREPARING THE FOREGOING FOR SUBMISSION IT OCCURS TO ME THAT OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE AN EARLY END TO SOVIET/ CUBAN PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE IN ANGOLA SHOULD BE REINFORCED AND EXPANDED BY SENDING INSTRUCTIONS TO CERTAIN KEY AFRICAN POSTS BRINGING TO THEIR ATTENTION OUR PERSISTENT POLICY IN THIS REGARD AND TRYING TO ENLIST THEIR ASSISTANCE TOWARD THE SAME END. I HAVE THEREFORE DRAFTED THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM WHICH WOULD BE SENT FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION BY EMBASSIES ABIDJAN, MONROVIA, DAKAR, BANGUI, DAR ES SALAM, RABAT, TUNIS, LIBREVILLE, AND YAOUNDE. IT WOULD ALSO BE SENT FOR INFORMATION AND USE WHEN NEEDED TO ALL OTHER POSTS IN THE OAU MEMBER STATES.

PROPOSED TELEGRAM:

SUBJECT: SOVIET-CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA

1. AS AFRICAN RECOGNITION OF MPLA ACCELERATES WE BELIEVE AFRICAN STATES, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO SHARE OUR APPRECIATION OF DANGER OF SOVIET/CUBAN INFLUENCE IN ANGOLA SHOULD DO WHATEVER IS POSSIBLE TO EXERT EFFECTIVE PRESSURE BOTH ON MPLA AND THOSE AFRICAN STATES CLOSEST TO IT, E.G. MOZAMBIQUE, NIGERIA, GHANA, TO PERSUADE MPLA OF NECESSITY TO REDUCE AND ELIMINATE SOVIET/CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA AND TO START PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

2. ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS AT HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL IN HOST GOVERNMENT. WE

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INLCUDE TANZANIA BECAUSE OF NYERERE'S REPORTED CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET INFLUENCE.

A. WE ASSUME THAT NEARLY ALL AFRICAN STATES WILL SHORTLY RECOGNIZE MPLA GOVERNMENT. WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES WILL PROBABLY DO LIKEWISE ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF THEY HELD OFF SOMEWHAT LONGER.

B. AS WE LOOK AT NEXT STAGE OF ANGOLAN SITUATION WE RECALL THAT NEARLY ALL AFRICAN STATES, WHETHER OR NOT THEY RECOGNIZED MPLA EARLIER, SHOWED CONCERN OVER EXTENT OF POSSIBLE SOVIET/CUBAN INFLUENCE IN FUTURE. IN SOME CASES ONE JUSTIFICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF MPLA WAS TO PROVIDE COUNTERBALANCE TO THAT INFLUENCE AND TO BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO PERSUADE MPLA OF ITS CONSEQUENCES.

C. AS HOST COUNTRY KNOWS THIS HAS BEEN PRIMARY PREOCCUPATION OF USG WHICH DID NOT OPPOSE MPLA PER SE.

D. THEREFORE WE URGE THAT HOST GOVERNMENT USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH MPLA EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH OTHER AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS TO BRING ABOUT END TO THIS MASSIVE FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA, ESPECIALLY FOREIGN TROOP PRESENCE. MPLA OFFICIALS HAVE PUBLICLY COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO THIS OBJECTIVE AND CLAIMED THAT ANGOLA WILL BE NATIONALIST AND NON-ALIGNED.

E. WE ALSO EARNESTLY HOPE THAT THEY WILL USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE THE BEGINNING OF RECONCILIATION OF ANGOLAN PEOPLE BY CREATING BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD ALSO ELIMINATE PRETEXT FOR CONTINUED SOVIET/CUBAN PRESENCE.

3. IT SEEMS TO US THAT, FOR THE FUTURE OF AFRICA, THESE SHOULD BE PRIMARY AFRICAN GOALS NOW THAT MPLA HAS APPARENTLY WON MILITARY VICTORY.

4. FOR DAKAR, ABIDJAN, LIBREVILLE, BANGUI. SUGGEST YOU ADD AN ADDITIONAL TALKING POINT TO EFFECT THAT WE ASSUME THEY SHARE OUR HOPE THAT CUBAN/SOUTH AFRICAN HOSTILITIES BE AVOIDED IF WE ARE TO PREVENT CONFLAGRATION IN SOUTHERN  
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AFRICA. REMOVAL OF CUBAN TROOPS WOULD BE BEST ASSURANCE OF THAT.

5. INFO POSTS: YOU MAY USE ABOVE TALKING POINTS (PARA 2) DISCREETLY IF OPPORTUNITY ARISES. WE MINDFUL THAT

ESPECIALLY NIGERIA,

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GHANA AND SUDAN, EXPRESSED EXPECTATION THEIR RECOGNITION  
WOULD GIVE THEM INFLUENCE WITH MPLA TO ASSURE THAT ANGOLA  
WOULD NOT BE DOMINATED BY SOVIETS AND THAT MPLA WOULD HAVE  
OTHER PLACES TO TURN TO FOR ADVICE AND, IN CASE OF NIGERIA,  
MATERIAL ASSISTANCE.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

THAT YOU APPROVE THE FOREGOING TALKING POINTS FOR USE BY

A. AMBASSADOR WILKOWSKI

APPROVE                      DISAPPROVE

B. CHARGE WALKER

APPROVE                      DISAPPROVE

THAT YOU APPROVE FOREGOING DRAFT TELEGRAM TO AF POSTS.

APPROVE                      DISAPPROVE

DRAFTED: AF: EWMULCAHY APPROVED: AF: WESCHAUFEBLE, JR.

CLEARED: S/S: P SHANKLE INGERSOLL

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